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Abstract: A central part of the Christian doctrine of the incarnation is 
that the Son of God ‘becomes’ incarnate. Furthermore, according to 
classical theism, God is timeless: He exists ‘outside’ of time, and His life 
has no temporal stages. A consequence of this ‘atemporalist’ view is that 
a timeless being cannot undergo intrinsic change—for this requires the 
being to be one way at one time, and a different way at a later time. 
How, then, can we understand the central Christian claim that the Son of 
God ‘becomes’ human? This paper examines one such explanation, 
drawn from a brief remark by Brian Leftow: the Word takes on flesh by 
exhibiting modal variation with regards to the incarnation. On this 
account, a timeless God ‘becomes’ incarnate simply due to variation 
across logical space: at some possible worlds He is incarnate and at 
others He is not. Modal variation need not, therefore, require 
temporality: it only requires variation across (static) possible worlds. I 
draw out the problems with Leftow’s modal claim under the heads of 
Ersatzism and Genuine Modal Realism about possible worlds, 
respectively. I argue that in both instances, Leftow’s desired cross–
worldly variation of the Son’s incarnation cannot be achieved.   
 
Keywords: Son of God, Incarnation, Atemporality, Modality, Divine 
Freedom 
 
A central part of the Christian doctrine of the incarnation is the notion of the 
Son ‘becoming’ incarnate. The Creed of Nicea states that ‘because of us men and 
because of our salvation [The Son] came down and became incarnate, becoming 
man’ (Kelly 1960, 216 italics mine). The Son did so, according to Christian belief, 
as a response to human sin. His prerogative was to remain unincarnate, but 
nevertheless He ‘took on flesh’ as a sacrifice for humankind.1 The Son’s sharing 
                                                          
1 Henceforth, I’ll refer to God (including the Son of God) using the male pronoun, for ease of 
consistency with the many quotations that I’ll draw upon. However, I (of course) want to 
remain neutral regarding God’s gender, or lack thereof. 
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our human condition has important soteriological features, in that His sacrifice 
paved the way for the rest of humanity to achieve salvation themselves. By 
living as a human, spreading the word about God’s existence, and suffering and 
dying on the cross as a human, the Son restored humankind’s relationship with 
God. This made it possible (or so it’s believed) for all mere mortals to achieve 
salvation. Importantly, this salvation is only thought to be possible because the 
Son truly became human: because divinity and humanity genuinely united into 
one single person. It can’t be that the Son merely appeared to become the 
human Jesus, whilst really remaining only divine, lest His sacrifice be 
diminished and our salvation be impossible. R. T. Mullins writes ‘if the 
incarnation is to be meaningful we must know that God Himself has become 
incarnate’ (2016, 178).  
I’m interested in the extent to which this central and indispensable Christian 
belief about the Son of God can be upheld in conjunction with the doctrine of 
divine timelessness. This is the classical view of God’s relation to time, which 
deems Him to be atemporal: He exists ‘outside’ of time and views all events in 
time as if in one ‘simultaneous present’. There are no temporal stages in an 
atemporal God’s life. Recently, Mullins has provided a clear and 
comprehensive definition of atemporality: ‘God is timeless if and only if God 
exists (i) without beginning, (ii) without end, and (iii) without succession. To 
say that God exists without succession means that God does not do one thing, 
and then another’ (2016, xvi).2 I’ll henceforth refer to proponents of this view of 
God’s relation to time as ‘atemporalists’.3 
                                                          
2 This is in contrast with divine temporalism, whereby God He exists ‘within’ time. Mullins 
provides the following conditions which he deems to be a necessary and sufficient guarantee of 
temporality: ‘God is temporal if and only if God exists (i) without beginning, (ii) without end, 
and (iii) with succession. The life of a temporal God is characterised by a succession of 
moments’ (2016, xvi). It’s important to note that only the final attribute has changed here from 
Mullins’ definition of a timeless God: whether or not God’s life comprises a succession of 
moments is what distinguishes a temporal God from a timeless one.  
3 Importantly, I’m considering the compatibility of incarnation and The Son’s atemporality. 
The question remains, then, whether the (a)temporal mode of the Son’s existence can be 
straightforwardly applied to the other two members of the Trinity. Thomas Senor argues that if 
one member of the Godhead possesses a particular relation to time, all members of the Godhead 
exist in that same relation (1990, 159–61). Mullins also suggests that it’s part of Arian heresy to 
attribute timelessness to the Father and temporality to the Son. He says that Arians ‘had no 
qualms denying divine timelessness…[to] the Son. On their understanding, only the Father 
enjoys these particular divine attributes because only the Father is the one true God, whereas 
the Son is a lesser divine being’ (2016, 162). I’m certainly inclined to agree with Senor and 
Mullins, for I feel that if different members of the Trinity exist in different relations to time, this 
is driving too much of a wedge between their respective existences. It also seems to threaten 
their shared essence. I don’t have the space to argue for this conclusion here, however. I’ll 
simply venture that all members of the Trinity exist in the same relation to time, and hope that 
 




An important consequence of atemporalism, for our purposes, is that a 
timeless being can’t undergo intrinsic change – for this requires something to be 
one way at one time, and a different way at a later time. Thomas Senor argues 
that in order for the Son to ‘take on’ human nature, He must be mutable, and so, 
temporal. He says: 
 
The question presently before us is whether one’s taking on X entails that in 
virtue of assuming X, one has changed. It certainly sounds to my ear as if the 
entailment holds. I can’t see how, if the Second Person of the Trinity is perfectly 
immutable (and so, atemporal), he could ‘take on’ anything. What he has, he 
has; what he has not, he has not (1990, 158–9).  
 
How, then, is the atemporalist to understand the central Christian claim that the 
Son of God ‘becomes’ human, if not by virtue of an intrinsic change? Given that 
the incarnation is a fundamental and indispensable aspect of Christianity, a 
suitable metaphysical explanation is required. There have recently been several 
attempts to provide just such an account, most of which appeal to some sort of 
extrinsic change on the part of God the Son, when a human body and soul join 
to Him, forming a composite. These are a form of compositionalist accounts of 
the incarnation, where Christ is comprised of various parts: ‘a compound of 
qualitatively and numerically different constituents: a divine mind, a human 
body, and, on some models, a human mind as well’ (Marmodoro and Hill 2010, 
469). Distinguishing between these different parts of Christ enables 
atemporalists to appeal to an intrinsic change in something other than the Son 
Himself. The intrinsic change presumably takes place in the created order, 
when the human parts of the composite come into existence.4 This in turn 
allows the divine part of the composite, the Son, to change only extrinsically 
when He becomes incarnate.5 Because this change is only extrinsic, it’s argued, 
the Son needn’t be temporal.  
The focus in this paper will be on elucidating an alternative, and hitherto 
unexplored, (potential) option for the atemporalist seeking to understand the 
claim that the Son of God ‘becomes’ incarnate. It’s drawn from a very brief 
                                                                                                                                                                          
this point is relatively uncontentious. At the very least, denying it would leave one facing many 
charges of unorthodox Trinitarianism. 
4 It can’t be the human components of the composite themselves that undergo intrinsic 
change, because ‘coming into existence’ isn’t a change that any thing can undergo. In order to 
change intrinsically, the subject of the change must exist both before and after the change, and 
yet if something comes into existence it doesn’t, by definition, exist prior to this event.  
5 See, for example, Hill (2012, 26–9), and Leftow (2002). 
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remark by Brian Leftow in his paper ‘A timeless God incarnate’ (2002, 273–
299).6 I call it Leftow’s ‘modal claim,’ and it’s as follows:  
 
The import of the ‘taking on’ [flesh] claim on God's side is modal, not temporal. 
That God took on flesh does not entail that he changed. It entails only that he 
could have been God without being incarnate, and that if he could have 
refrained from becoming incarnate, he could have not had a body. Here I 
simply bat the ball back onto the temporalist’s side of the net: why isn’t this 
enough to make orthodox sense of the claim that God the Son took on flesh? 
(2002, 299)  
 
Arguably, atemporalists could adopt Leftow’s claim as a way of explaining how 
the Son became incarnate without being subject to the passage of time. If we 
read ‘became’ or ‘taking on’ in a modal sense, the Word becomes flesh in that in 
this world He takes on human form, but in other possible worlds He doesn’t. 
Understanding Leftow’s claim in terms of possible worlds tells us that there are 
possible worlds that are exactly the same as ours, except that they lack a divine 
incarnation, meaning that they also presumably lack atonement for any sin that 
takes place there.7 According to Leftow, we therefore have variation across 
logical space regarding the incarnation. This is an independently important 
claim to uphold, for it helps to emphasise the supererogatory sacrifice that the 
Son made for us. The difference is that Leftow needs this variation in order for 
his argument to go through: he seems to think that instead of intrinsic change, 
this cross–worldly variation regarding the incarnation is all that we need to 
make sense of a timeless Son ‘becoming’ incarnate.  
The focus of this paper will be to give Leftow’s modal claim the scrutiny that 
it deserves. I’ll consider different ways of cashing it out, arguing that it doesn’t 
in fact leave us with Leftow’s desired modal variation, and so it can’t be 
appealed to as a means of explaining a timeless God becoming incarnate. A 
further unwelcome consequence falls out of this result: divine libertarian 
freedom is impinged upon. In section 1, I present an argument that Leftow’s 
claim doesn’t give us modal variation, and respond (sections 2–3) to potential 
objections to the weakest premises. Sections 4 and 5 consider the problematic 
implications of Leftow’s argument for ersatzism and genuine modal realism 
about possible worlds, respectively. I conclude that, in light of these arguments, 
                                                          
6 Leftow also defends the compositionalist account of extrinsic change (mentioned above) in 
the same paper. His modal claim is altogether distinct from this, however—and is mentioned 
only in passing.  
7 Unless there are other ways to achieve atonement besides incarnation. This will be 
discussed in section 3. 




atemporalists can’t appeal to modal variation as a way that the Son becomes 
incarnate, without taking on board serious dialectical tensions. 
Before we venture into these specifics, though, it’s tempting to object that 
Leftow’s modal claim is a non–starter, because it’s simply too weak to do the 
work that we need. Surely, even if we can make sense of the Son not taking on a 
body in other possible worlds, this claim isn’t substantial enough for us to be 
able to say that He ‘became’ incarnate? The incarnation takes place in the actual 
world – the Word becomes flesh. Surely, then, there must be a sense in which 
the Son takes on flesh relative only to the history of this world, regardless of 
what happens at other worlds? Not wanting to beg the question against 
Leftow’s modal account, I’ll grant for the sake of argument that we can make 
sense of something ‘becoming’ something else due solely to modal variation. 
My objection to Leftow will instead lie in revealing the unwelcome tensions and 
consequences that follow once we apply his claim to particular understandings of 
modality.  
It’s important to emphasise the sense of the Son’s libertarian freedom that’s 
implicit in Leftow’s claim. Libertarian freedom rests on a form of 
incompatibilism: the view that our freedom is incompatible with our actions 
being causally determined. It’s also commonly thought to require alternative 
possibilities for action. So, I’m free to do x iff at the time of performing x, it’s 
possible that I refrain from doing so. For instance, I’m free to get a puppy iff, at 
the time of doing so, it’s possible that I refrain.8 There must be alternative 
possibilities available to me, such as changing my mind and going home 
empty–handed, or getting a hamster instead. Leftow seems to require that the 
Son be free in this libertarian sense, because he stresses in the passage above 
that God ‘could have refrained’ from being incarnate. It must be possible that 
He refrain from taking on a body.9 Leftow also endorses libertarian divine 
                                                          
8 See, e.g. Diekemper (2012, 47–8).  
9 Some compatibilists might object here that there’s nothing preventing them from accepting 
this appeal to alternative possibilities. David Lewis, for example, stresses that even in the face of 
a causally determined universe, it would be the case that I’m able to act otherwise than the way 
in which I in fact act. He argues that I’m able to do otherwise in the sense that if I do something 
which it was determined that I’d not do, then some law of nature would have been broken 
(Lewis 1981, 122–29). However, even if the universe is causally determined, this isn’t something 
that God’s freedom would have to be rendered compatible with, given that He created the 
universe ex nihilo (more on this anon). Moreover, I’m assuming here that God is atemporal, 
which makes it still easier to see how He’s removed from the (determined) causal unfoldings of 
the universe. I therefore contend that, whilst compatibilists might be able to help themselves to 
the principle of alternative possibilities regarding human freedom, this isn’t something that 
makes sense in the case of divine freedom. It would be a mistake to allege that the determined 




freedom and the principle of alternative possibilities elsewhere. He says in a 
recent paper that ‘God acts freely, in a robust sense which implies He could 
have acted otherwise’ (Leftow 2016, 47). He reads this possibility of refraining 
in a libertarian sense (Leftow forthcoming). This is evidently an important 
reason why, for Leftow, there must be variation across possible worlds 
regarding incarnations. I’ll now present an argument that Leftow’s claim, when 
cashed out, doesn’t give us his desired variation across possible worlds.  
 
1. Leftow’s Claim doesn’t give us Modal Variation 
 
(P1) The Son takes on a body in the actual world to redeem us from sin, 
and because of His omnibenevolence.10 
(P2) There are other possible worlds that contain as much/more sin than 
ours. 
(P3) If the Son takes on a body in no other possible worlds, then there are 
possible worlds that contain as much, or more, sin than ours, in which 
there are no incarnations. 
(P4) There are no ways, besides incarnation, that salvation can be 
achieved.  
(P5) If God becomes incarnate at a world w, but not at other worlds with 
as much or more sin than w, then He isn’t omnibenevolent.  
(C1) (From P1, P3, P4 & P5) If the Son doesn’t take on a body in all the 
possible worlds with as much/more sin than ours, then He isn’t 
omnibenevolent.  
(P6) God is omnibenevolent.  
(C2) (From C1 & P5 via modus tollens) The Son takes on a body in all the 
possible worlds with as much/more sin than ours.  
(C3) (From C2) Quantifying over all worlds with as much or more sin 
than ours, the Son necessarily takes on a body.  
 
(P1) states God’s omnibenevolence, and the purpose of the incarnation being 
atonement. (P2) follows from the contingency of sin, together with the belief 
that humans have been given free will. We can suppose that for every logically 
possible human, and every logically possible action they might carry out, 
there’s a possible world to represent this. Many of these worlds will be ones 
                                                                                                                                                                          
from—is something that His freedom needs to be made compatible with. However, a different 
version of a compatibilist divine freedom will be discussed in section 4. 
10 Henceforth, I’ll be assuming that ‘sin’ is equivalent to ‘evil,’ so long as evil is understood 
as being actively caused by humankind, or by the inhabitants of the particular world in 
question.  




containing more sin than this one. For instance, there’s a possible world where I 
kick puppies instead of studying philosophy. This world (assuming it’s 
otherwise the same as ours) seems – quite uncontentiously – to be a more sinful 
world than ours. (P3) follows if we accept (P2). As I’ve mentioned, the only way 
that atonement could have been achieved was for the Son to truly become one of 
us in order to restore humankind’s relationship with God, and this is 
represented here by (P4). The basis for (P5) is God’s omnibenevolence being 
such that He wouldn’t permit worlds with the same amount, or more, sin than 
our own to not be atoned, whilst nevertheless becoming incarnate in our world. 
If He did permit this, it would make His decision to be incarnate in our world 
an arbitrary one, so not one that, I submit, we’d wish to attribute to a perfectly 
loving and rational God. In fact, it would be possible for a more loving being to 
exist, who is incarnate in these other worlds, and makes reasoned, fair decisions 
to boot. (P6) is a requirement of classical theism. We derive (C2) from (C1) and 
(P6) via modus tollens. (C3) then follows from (C2) because at all of the worlds 
with as much or more sin than ours, the Son takes on a body, which on a 
reductive account of modality is just what it means to say that taking on a body 
is (quantifying over these worlds) necessary. If this argument is sound, Leftow’s 
modal claim can’t explain how a timeless God ‘becomes’ incarnate. I’ll now 
consider, and respond to, some potential objections.  
 
2. Concerning ‘Relevantly Similar’ Worlds 
 
An initial objection raises its head, regarding my quantifying only over the 
worlds with as much, or more, sin that our own. (C2) claims that all of the 
worlds ‘with as much or more sin than ours’ contain the Son taking on a body. 
It might be objected that Leftow’s desired modal variation is in fact achieved, 
because the scope of (C2) is too narrow. After all, it doesn’t mention the worlds 
containing less sin than our own, where no incarnations are required. It’s these 
(incarnation free) worlds that would generate modal variation, the argument 
would go. In response to this, I maintain that we must restrict our scope to 
closer, relevantly similar worlds to our own if we wish to generate a sufficiently 
substantial sense in which the Son ‘could have refrained’ from being incarnate. I 
contend that the worlds relevant to Leftow’s argument must be relevantly 
similar in (at least) the following way: they must contain the same amount, or 
more, sin than our own.11  
                                                          
11 Perhaps in order to count as ‘relevantly similar,’ the worlds in question also ought to 
contain inhabitants who are free in the same way that we are. This is in light of discussion that 
will follow in section 4. 
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This qualification isn’t an ad hoc addendum, but has independent motivation 
due to the aforementioned emphasis that Leftow places upon the libertarian 
freedom of the Son. Importantly, when scrutinising our libertarian freedom, we 
look to the closest possible worlds to examine whether it’s possible for us to 
refrain from acting in a certain way. For instance, if I want to know whether it’s 
possible for me to refrain from getting a puppy, I look to the closest possible 
worlds where, for instance, my history up until now, my living situation, 
financial situation and love of animals are all the same as at this world – and see 
whether or not these worlds contain my obtaining a puppy. I’m not concerned 
with the distant worlds in which, say, I actively despise dogs, or dogs don’t 
even exist. Likewise, if we want to account (as Leftow evidently does) for a 
genuine sense of the Son’s libertarian freedom to take on flesh, we must look to 
the relevantly similar worlds, and see whether He’s incarnate there. Although 
only one incarnation–free world is needed for Leftow’s claim to go through, this 
world must be one that contains the same amount, or more, sin than ours, 
because of the emphasis being placed on the Son’s free decision to respond to 
sin. Insofar as the incarnation is a response to sin, then, our attention ought not 
to be occupied by distant worlds with less sin than our own. We should restrict 
it only to the worlds with as much, or more sin than ours. At all of these, I’ve 
argued, the Son is incarnate.   
 
3. Potential responses 
 
Perhaps the most contentious premise is (P4). Leftow might object to it for 
several different reasons. Firstly, he could argue that the Son didn’t need to 
respond to sin specifically by taking on a body. That is, there could be other 
ways in which Atonement could be achieved, such that God can remain 
perfectly good and loving even if He doesn’t respond to sin by becoming 
incarnate. A species of this objection might be the case of a possible world 
whose inhabitants aren’t embodied.12 If this were the case, the argument would 
go, then (P4) is false, because the Son wouldn’t need to take on a body in order 
to atone for the sins of that world’s inhabitants. More broadly, even in cases 
where our counterparts are embodied, there could simply be other ways (ways 
that we can’t begin to comprehend) in which the Son could atone for our sins, 
besides taking on flesh.  
                                                          
12 Supposing, of course, that these disembodied beings could be our counterparts. They 
would need to be such in order for this possible world to count as sufficiently close to our own, 
to generate the desired sense in which the Son ‘could have refrained’ from being incarnate. 
After all, the more distant the possible worlds that we use to support this claim, the less we’re 
able to take account of the Son’s free decision to take on flesh.  




I think it would still be possible to retain the spirit of my argument if, in 
response to this objection, I broadened my claims so that instead of referring to 
physical incarnations, or the taking on of a body, I appealed instead to any 
soteriological gesture on behalf of the Son. If I plugged something like this into 
my argument, then its wider scope would generate the (still, for Leftow, 
unwelcome) result that at all worlds with as much, or more, sin that ours, the 
Son engages in some sort of soteriological action. A similar conclusion to (C3) 
would be generated, and would be something like: ‘quantifying over all worlds 
with as much or more sin than ours, the Son necessarily acts to redeem us from 
sin’. However, any divine action to save us from sin, I’d argue, ought to be 
freely chosen – and, therefore, contingent. In this broader context, it would thus 
also need to exhibit modal variation. I therefore contend that my argument can 
be widened in such a way that it creates a problem for Leftow’s modal claim 
even when we factor in possible worlds containing incorporeal inhabitants or 
alternative forms of Atonement. This would additionally keep us in line with 
Leftow’s recent suggestion that: 
 
Christians believe that their salvation is an act of free grace: that God need not 
have sent Christ to die for them. Even those who think that God’s love 
guaranteed His doing something to save us may think that He need not have 
done so by sending Christ (2017, 152). 
 
Again, it could be responded here that even if it wasn’t specifically incarnation 
that was necessary to redeem us from our sins, God (being omnibenevolent), 
would still have responded to sin with some sort of soteriological gesture. This 
would be the case in every world with as much, or more, sin than our own, it 
could be argued, otherwise we can imagine a more loving (and less arbitrary 
being) who would treat all worlds fairly. I’ll henceforth leave (P4) as it is, 
referring specifically to incarnation as a response to sin, but if one prefers, one 
can imagine my argument widened in the way suggested above. 
Changing tack slightly, Leftow might object to (P5) by claiming that the Son 
can remain omnibenevolent in spite of not becoming incarnate (or, in line with 
the above, wider argument: in spite of not engaging in any soteriological 
gesture) at the worlds with as much, or more, sin than a world w – in this case, 
our world. It seems strange, after all, to insist that there’s a precise level of sin, 
at which point God must personally intervene by taking on human form. 
Leftow could appeal to divine mystery, and reject the assumption that God’s 
omnibenevolence necessitates an incarnation whenever there’s a world as sinful 
as our own. At any rate, perhaps there’s far more to be considered in what 
makes for the ‘best’ world besides the level, or quantity, of sin, and God 
considers this when surveying worlds and their need for atonement. We, on the 
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other hand, have no real insight into God’s reasons. On this account, Leftow 
could argue that it merely seems arbitrary and reasonless to us if there are two 
worlds with equal levels of sin, but God is only incarnate at one: in fact, our 
omniscient God has (timelessly) surveyed both worlds, and taken everything 
into account, and made a fully–informed decision about what’s best for each of 
these worlds.  
In response to this, I grant that it’s possible that God is taking far more into 
account than levels of sin when considering whether or not to be incarnate in 
various worlds. However, the incarnation is of course a response to sin, and I’m 
therefore confident that sin must at least be an important factor in world 
rankings. I venture that the burden of proof is on theists in Leftow’s camp to 
demonstrate what else exactly could be considered in making for the best 
possible world. Might it be the number of people (or other inhabitants) that 
exist in a world, for instance? Or, might it be to do with the ubiquity of sin 
within any world in question? Arguments along these lines would need 
additional support. Alternatively, if Leftow were to explain God’s decision to be 
incarnate by appeal to divine mystery, then this is less satisfying given that I’m 
attempting to elucidate metaphysical issues – namely, how a timeless Son can 
become incarnate.  
There’s a related objection to (P5) in the vicinity, which I consider more 
troubling. Leftow might object that it’s crude to assume that sin can in fact be 
measured in the way that I’m suggesting. If this were the case my argument 
wouldn’t stand, because one wouldn’t be able to compare levels of sin across 
worlds. After all, it seems very difficult to imagine that there’s some sort of 
‘unit’ by which we could compare, say, the sin involved in a mass murder with 
the sin involved in mass torture. If this were the case, (P2) could also be denied, 
and my overall conclusion would no longer follow. Nonetheless, given that 
God did respond to sin in the actual world by taking on human form, there must 
have been something that made Him think that this response was required, lest 
the response be arbitrary. Furthermore, implicit in Leftow’s modal claim is the 
assumption that God responded to sin in at least one world, but not in others. 
It’s difficult to see how these responses (or non–responses) can be motivated 
without some consideration of levels of sin at the worlds in question. I therefore 
contend that the burden of proof is again on Leftow to demonstrate why this 
consideration of sin can’t be applied to other worlds, and compared across 
worlds. 
Having considered these potential objections, I maintain that, at the very 
least, there are serious tensions embedded in Leftow’s modal claim. We’re 
unable to generate Leftow’s desired conception of ‘becoming’ incarnate, 




because we find that the Son takes on a body in all of the relevantly similar 
worlds to our own (‘relevantly similar’ regarding their amounts of sin).13 This is 
problematic for two reasons. Firstly, we can’t make sense of modal variation 
regarding the incarnation, which limits the lines of argument at the 
atemporalist’s disposal for explaining the Son ‘becoming’ incarnate. Secondly, 
the modal claim impinges upon the Son’s libertarian freedom, because no 
relevantly similar possible worlds contain His refraining from incarnation. 
Divine libertarian freedom is evidently something that Leftow would want to 
preserve, and we’ve seen evidence of this above. In fact, I don’t think it would 
be presumptuous to say that most theists would want to preserve this. They’d 
want to maintain that God is the freest of all beings, whose freedom doesn’t 
need to be rendered compatible with, for instance, His causally determined 
actions, in order to count as freedom. Moreover, if the Son isn’t free to do 
anything other than take on flesh, then it also presumably makes little sense for 
us to praise or thank Him for doing so – since it emerges that it wasn’t a choice 
that He was responsible for making. There are some differences in the 
implications (and potential responses to) this argument, depending upon how 
we understand these possible worlds – so I’ll now further develop and defend 
my argument under the heads of ersatzism and genuine modal realism about 
possible worlds, respectively. 
 
4. Ersatz Modal Realism (EMR) 
 
The possible worlds that Leftow invokes in his modal claim could be 
understood in an ersatzist sense, whereby they’re ‘surrogates’ for the actual 
world, but don’t concretely exist. Rather, they’re more like maximally consistent 
states of affairs that form total ‘conditions’ that a concrete world could be in.14 
Ersatzists are usually actualists: they’re committed to the view that everything 
that exists actually exists. The contents of all possible worlds actually (but non–
                                                          
13 It will not do to respond here that there is a possible world much like ours in the amount 
and distribution of sin, where the Son does not become incarnate because instead the Holy Spirit 
does so. If this were the case, it would indeed be possible for the Son to refrain from becoming 
incarnate. Thank you to an anonymous referee for raising this objection. I am being specific in 
my referring to the Son, but the Son is of course (on an orthodox understanding of the Trinity) 
simply God, as are the Father and Holy Spirit. If there is a possible world where the Son refrains 
from becoming incarnate, but the Holy Spirit does become incarnate, it remains the case that God 
becomes incarnate at this world—and at all words with as much or more sin than our own. This 
latter result, I would argue, is equally problematic.  
14 I don’t think it matters for my account whether I sketch the ersatzist view with regards to 
possible worlds being states of affairs, or anything else, such as propositions or sets of 
propositions: one can simply substitute in one’s favoured interpretation.  
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concretely) exist, because they’re constructed from things that themselves 
actually exist. Ersatzists are therefore still modal realists, of a certain stripe. The 
actual world is the only world that happens to obtain, on EMR. It therefore has a 
special status: it’s actualised, because it’s the way that things in fact are. I’ll 
defend the view that if we understand Leftow’s modal claim as an ersatzist 
would, we can’t achieve the desired variation across worlds. 
Ersatzists would read (P1) in the above argument as the Son taking on a 
body in the actual world – which is the only world that in fact obtains. Relatedly, 
Michael Almeida suggests that, because with EMR (and unlike with genuine 
modal realism) it’s impossible to actualise more than one world, ‘theists in the 
Leibnizian tradition are committed to the unlikely proposition that the actual 
world, with all of its evil, is as good as any other actualisable world’ (2011, 1). 
Given divine omnibenevolence (P6), I venture that He’d desire to actualise the 
world containing the least amount of sin possible. Ersatzists ought therefore to 
assume that God has actualised, or created, the best of all possible worlds: so all 
of the others will contain more (or the same amount of) sin than our own.15  
The ersatzist will thus interpret (P2) as being potentially even stronger than it 
first appeared, because all possible worlds will contain as much, or more, sin 
than our own. Any worlds containing less sin than our own are impossible, for 
otherwise they would have been actualised. This is perhaps because less sin 
                                                          
15 Robert Adams (1972, 317–332) disputes the assumption that God created the best possible 
world. He says that God isn’t blameworthy if He creates a world that’s less than the best, with 
the caveat that there be no creature in it so miserable that it’d be better had it not existed. 
Adams says that God hasn’t wronged anybody in creating this world, because the creatures in 
the other worlds don’t exist, and merely possible beings don’t have rights. An important part of 
Adams’s argument is that God’s grace (defined as the disposition to love independently of the 
merits of persons (ibid., 324)), means that He has no reason to love the inhabitants of one world 
more than any other. If this were true, then the actual world might not be the best of all possible 
worlds, and there could indeed be others that contain less sin and so need no divine 
incarnations. However, I follow William Rowe (2004) in objecting that Adams has merely 
shown that God isn’t morally obliged to create the best world that He can. Rowe argues that this 
can be true and it still be the case that God’s perfect goodness renders it necessary that He create 
the best possible world. Rowe argues that if God didn’t create the best world that He could, 
then He wouldn’t be perfectly good, because it would be possible for a more perfect being to 
exist. Even though creating the best was a supererogatory act (and hence, not one that God was 
obliged to carry out), some other morally better being could possibly create the best world, and 
God would no longer be the most perfect being as a matter of necessity. Rowe adds that if God 
has a reason for picking a world to actualise, it wouldn’t have anything to do with grace as 
defined by Adams, because God wouldn’t be able to select any worlds at all if He were only 
judging based on loving independently of merit. Even if one is convinced by Adams, however, I 
argued in section 2 that other worlds with less sin and no incarnations aren’t sufficient to 
generate Leftow’s modal variation, because they’re not close enough to be relevant to our 
considerations. 




would generate a contradiction in all of the ‘maximal consistent sentences’ (or 
similar) that are ersatzist possible worlds. For the ersatzist, (C3) therefore 
wouldn’t merely mean that all of the worlds with as much, or more, sin than 
our own contain divine incarnations – but that all other possible worlds contain 
divine incarnations.16 If this is so, we wouldn’t even need the justification given 
in section 2 for appealing only to ‘relevantly similar’ worlds. This is because all 
worlds would be relevantly similar in the required sense – they’d all contain as 
much, or more, sin than our own. There would then be no sense in which we 
can derive Leftow’s desired modal variation. This is also problematic for the 
Son’s freedom, because there are absolutely no worlds where He’s not 
incarnate, and so no sense in which He could have refrained from being so. 
Because the best (and so, actualised), possible world contains so much sin that 
the Son is incarnate in it, all other (less good) worlds must contain incarnations 
too, in response to the amounts of sin that exist there. The Son’s being incarnate 
in the world He actualised therefore necessitates His being incarnate at all other 
worlds.  
One line of response here might be to maintain that the best world isn’t 
simply the world containing the least amount of sin. Rather, it’s the world with 
the least amount of sin, together with a sufficient level of human free will.17 If this 
can be granted, then it’s not so clear that all other worlds must contain more sin 
than this one – nor, therefore, is it clear that they must contain a divine 
incarnation. I’m inclined to agree that a sufficient sense of human free will is an 
important requirement of the best possible world. However, I maintain that this 
has no bearing on the fact that this world (the best world) has been actualised. 
All other worlds will contain either more sin (together with human free will) or 
less sin (without a sufficient sense of human free will). The former worlds will 
contain divine incarnations as a response to sin and so won’t help Leftow with 
his desired modal variation. The latter worlds, because they lack a sufficient 
sense of human free will, are far too distant to be relevant to this argument, 
                                                          
16 It might be objected that not all worlds contain divine incarnations, because there are some 
possible worlds with no created life in them at all. I’d respond that equally, these worlds 
contain no sin either, and (in light of discussion in section 2), simply aren’t close enough to ours 
to count as ‘relevantly similar.’ Leftow would surely want the sense in which God ‘could have 
refrained’ from being incarnate to be more robust than this. That is, we want to be able to say 
that God ‘could have refrained’ from being incarnate because some inhabited worlds with free 
creatures don’t contain divine incarnations. This is the only way that we could generate the 
contingent nature of the Son’s sacrifice. It doesn’t seem very substantial to say that the Son 
needn’t have taken on flesh because He’s not incarnate at some uninhabited worlds where the 
question of salvation is irrelevant.  
17 This response is a species of the objection discussed in section 3. The objection was that 
there’s more to be considered in what makes for the ‘best’ possible world besides the amount of 
sin that exists there.  
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because to say that the Son refrained from being incarnate in worlds where 
humans aren’t even free to sin in the first place isn’t to say very much at all. We 
don’t generate a substantial sense in which the Son ‘could have refrained’ from 
being incarnate if we need to appeal to worlds which contain similar levels of 
sin, but unfree inhabitants. Rather, when evaluating whether it’s possible that 
God could have refrained from being incarnate, we must look to the relevantly 
similar worlds. Although what’s meant by ‘relevantly similar’ is arguably not 
crystal clear, I think it’s safe to say that worlds containing unfree inhabitants are 
definitely not ones that should factor into our calculations. 
An alternative response might come from the compatibilist about divine 
freedom. It could be maintained that in spite of there being no possible worlds 
that lack divine incarnations, we can still consider the Son to be free. Moreover, 
the compatibilist might argue that we can still make sense of the fact that the 
Son ‘could have refrained’ from being incarnate. This could be cashed out in 
terms of the Son (being omnipotent) having the power to refrain from being 
incarnate at every possible world, even if He doesn’t in fact refrain from this at 
any. Helen Beebee discusses a version of this compatibilist response to the 
principle of alternative possibilities, which is to provide a ‘conditional analysis’ 
of claims about our freedom. For instance: ‘to say that I was able to do X, even 
though I did not in fact do so, is just to say that, had I chosen, or decided, or 
wanted to do X, I would have done it’ (2003, 259). This is a variant of the 
Lewisian response discussed earlier. In the case of an omnipotent God, 
therefore, it could hardly be denied that, had He chosen or decided not to be 
incarnate in any world, He’d of course have so refrained. As was mentioned 
above, this wouldn’t be compatibilism in the sense that we’re used to with 
ordinary humans, where free will is taken to be compatible with a causally 
determined universe. This is because in the divine case the determined universe 
would itself be (freely) created ex nihilo by God. Therefore, to be a compatibilist 
about divine freedom would be to say (something like) God is free to do x 
‘provided nothing outside of him determines him to [do x]’ (Rowe & Howard–
Snyder 2008). This is spelled out a little more by Thomas Talbott, who says: 
 
Even when God acts from an inner necessity, he remains the agent cause of his 
actions in just this sense: Each of them reflects his own perfectly rational 
judgement concerning the best course of action; none of them is the product of 
sufficient causes external to himself; and none of them is even partially a matter 
of random chance (2009, 378). 
 
The common thread here appears to be that God is free because nothing external 
to Himself determines His action. This account could therefore be said to be 
compatibilist because God’s freedom is deemed compatible with His nature. For 




instance, God may have no option to refrain from being incarnate when we 
factor in His omnibenevolent nature, but He’s still free with respect to this 
action – because nothing external to Himself causes the incarnation to be 
brought about. The compatibilist could therefore appeal to this understanding 
of divine freedom and maintain that God ‘could have refrained’ from becoming 
incarnate because He possesses the ability to refrain, and nothing external to His 
nature causes Him to be incarnate. His nature might ensure that He desires to 
sacrifice His divine prerogative and be incarnate, but had He not wanted to do 
so, He of course wouldn’t have. It seems that this sort of compatibilism is 
maintaining that divine freedom is compatible with something like ‘rational’ 
determinism – ‘the determination of what the agent does by the best reasons’ 
(Steward 2015, 68). Helen Steward observes that this is altogether different from 
compatibilism in the ordinary case, where human freedom is reckoned 
compatible with causal determinism (ibid., 69).  
I nevertheless can’t make sense of the compatibilist’s claim about ability 
without relying on a modal understanding of what it means. As I see it, if the 
compatibilist claim is to go through, there must be a possible world in which God 
decides not to be incarnate, and so isn’t incarnate. For instance, the Son was able 
to refrain from being incarnate iff there’s a possible world in which He decides 
against taking on flesh. Possible worlds, after all, represent the entirety of 
logical space, so if there’s no possible world in which God refrains from being 
incarnate, we can’t say (as Leftow desires) that God ‘could have refrained’ from 
being incarnate. However, whether there are any possible worlds that don’t 
contain incarnations is of course exactly what’s up for grabs in this discussion. 
Therefore, whether or not the compatibilist’s argument has any traction 
depends on how much you’re convinced by the argument that follows in this 
paper. There is, however, a great deal more debate to be had in this area.  
Notwithstanding my previous worry, I think that most theists would wish to 
avoid compatibilist accounts of God’s freedom: they wouldn’t be happy to 
accept that God’s freedom needs to be rendered compatible with, for instance, 
His causally determined actions or His nature, given that He ought to be the 
freest possible being. This would also be an unwelcome result for Leftow 
himself: we’ve seen that he’s argued elsewhere for incompatibilism regarding 
divine freedom. As long as Leftow is committed to his modal claim, however, a 
compatibilist understanding of divine freedom looks to me like His only option.  
An alternative response from Leftow might be that there are in fact worlds 
that lack incarnations, and this is why these particular worlds aren’t actualised, 
because – all things being equal – worlds with an opportunity for atonement are 
preferable to worlds without this opportunity. If this were the case, Leftow’s 
modal claim would go through, together with libertarian divine freedom. 
However, this option isn’t available given the indispensable assumption that 
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God is necessarily omnibenevolent. To grant that some worlds with as much, or 
more, sin than our own don’t contain divine incarnations is in effect suggesting 
that the Son’s decision to be incarnate in our world is an arbitrary, reasonless 
one. It also suggests the possibility of a more loving being existing, who is 
incarnate at these worlds. Furthermore, it’s important to note that these other 
worlds might have been actualised, and if they had obtained, the Son (being 
omnibenevolent), would be incarnate in them – which is just what it means to 
say that the Son is incarnate at these other worlds.18  
I therefore conclude that if we interpret Leftow’s argument as an ersatzist 
would, we’re unable to achieve Leftow’s desired variation across worlds. In 
fact, it emerges that there are no worlds in which the Son isn’t incarnate. I’ll 
now consider whether genuine modal realists have an ontology that’s any 
better for upholding Leftow’s modal claim. 
 
5. Genuine Modal Realism (GMR) 
 
GMR, like EMR, is a reductive theory of possibility and necessity, so, for 
instance, something is necessary if it exists in every possible world. David Lewis 
calls our world the ‘actual’ world, but only because it’s the world where we 
happen to find ourselves, not because it’s any more real than the other possible 
worlds (1986, 92). In fact, the other possible worlds are no different in kind from 
the actual world, and all worlds concretely exist. For Lewis, ‘actual’ functions as 
an indexical term, just like ‘here’ or ‘there.’ Inhabitants of other possible worlds 
will likewise correctly call their own world ‘actual,’ so everybody in logical 
space can say ‘the actual world is the world in which I’m located,’ and be 
speaking the truth. According to GMR, for every way that a world could be, 
there’s a world that is that way (ibid., 2), and these worlds are concrete, 
maximal sums of spatio–temporally related individuals (ibid., 74). There are no 
spatio–temporal connections between worlds, so nothing that exists at this world 
can also exist at another world – lest the worlds in question not be distinct after 
all. Instead, we (and other members of worlds) have counterparts at other 
possible worlds, and our counterparts resemble us in important ways ‘in 
content and context’ (1968, 114). We might say, for instance, that it’s contingent 
that yellow is my favourite colour in virtue of my having a counterpart at 
                                                          
18 Unless, of course, the atemporalist maintains that all other worlds are impossible, given 
God’s omnibenevolence ensuring that He’ll only ever create the best possible world. This would 
be to endorse modal collapse: there’s only one world that God could have created, given His 
omnibenevolence, and thus the actual world is the only possible world. If Leftow were to take 
this line, however, he’d be throwing the baby out with the bath water, because if all other 
worlds were impossible his modal claim wouldn’t even get off the ground.  




another world, whose favourite colour is blue. This counterpart resembles me 
in other ways that are sufficient for her being my counterpart – she might, for 
instance, have the same genetic make–up, the same parents (or at least, 
counterparts of my parents), and the same life story as I have in this world.19  
So, how would someone who’s both a theist and a genuine modal realist 
make sense of my argument responding to Leftow? Some noteworthy specifics 
are that she’d read (P2) particularly strongly, because for her these other worlds 
containing as much, or more, sin than our own, are real, concretely existing 
worlds. I venture that (P5) remains strong: if there are concretely existing 
worlds containing as much, or more, sin than our own, then the Son ought to 
care about them just as much as He cares about ours. Otherwise, we’d not be 
able to put the ‘omni’ in ‘omnibenevolent’ when describing God. Almeida 
endorses this when he says, whilst discussing theistic GMR, ‘the suffering of 
other concrete universes is no less genuine than the suffering in our universe. 
We perhaps have special obligations to our worldmates. But certainly God’s 
concern is with the multiverse as a whole’ (2011, 10). (P6) is, once again, an 
indispensable requirement of theism, and so the conclusion is again generated 
that the Son takes on a body in all of the worlds with as much, or more, sin than 
ours. Before considering more specific consequences of this argument for 
genuine modal realists, I’ll examine the possibility that their claim doesn’t even 
get off the ground, because we can’t make sense of timeless existence ‘at’ any 
world at all. 
 
5.1. Timeless existence ‘at’ every world? 
 
Paul Sheehy has argued that if God is atemporal, He can’t exist at any genuine 
modal realist worlds. This is because to exist at any one world is to exist within 
the confines of space and time. Indeed, the spatio–temporal separation of 
worlds is a crucial part of Lewis’s account. This leads Sheehy to suggest that, 
for GMR, ‘there can be no God at the actual world or counterparts at each of the 
other worlds’ (2006, 318). The worry would mean that a timeless God can’t be 
necessary, because necessary existence just is existence at every possible world. 
Importantly, ersatzists don’t face this worry, because their possible worlds are 
                                                          
19 These suggested traits are just examples—I’m not arguing that their possession is essential 
for qualifying as one’s counterpart. I think that our intuitions regarding what can count as our 
counterparts are mostly in agreement. For instance, we’d all (I hope) agree that I can’t have a 
counterpart that is, say, a desk. Lewis comments on a similarly absurd candidate for 
counterparthood: ‘I suppose I might want to be a poached egg. (An ordinary poached egg—not 
an eggy creature that walks and talks). Would I then want to inhabit one of the worlds where I 
am a poached egg? That’s not it. I take it that there are no such worlds. No poached egg is a 
counterpart of mine!’ (1979, 530).  
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non–concrete entities that don’t postulate numerous spatio–temporally isolated 
worlds, all of which God must exist at. Rather, ersatz possible worlds are 
maximally consistent sets of propositions or simply ways that the world could be: 
we can therefore safely say that God’s existence (given that His existence is 
necessary) is included in all of these sets. Sheehy proposes a way out for the 
genuine modal realist, which is that each world consists of a maximal set of 
spatio–temporally related objects and ‘the domain of abstracta’ (ibid., 319), 
which is atemporal and aspatial. If God exists as part of this domain, He could 
thus be timeless and necessary. However, Sheehy warns of the unparsimonious 
move of adding this extra domain into our ontology, whereas if God could 
straightforwardly exist ‘at’ a world we require just the one fundamental 
ontological category.  
Nevertheless, Ross Cameron responds to Sheehy by arguing (as he claims 
Lewis would) that an atemporal God could exist ‘at each world’ in the sense 
that He exists from the standpoint of each world. Cameron uses Lewis’s 
argument that pure sets such as numbers exist from the standpoint of every 
world, to argue that ‘the theist should grant God the same status as pure sets 
have in this regard’ (2009, 97), and this is sufficient to claim that God exists 
necessarily. Cameron cites Lewis’s definition of existing from the standpoint of 
a world: it ‘belongs to the least restricted domain that is normally…appropriate 
in evaluating the truth at that world of quantifications’ (Lewis 1983b, 40). 
Cameron says that Lewis doesn’t even claim that GMR gets rid of any 
commitment to abstracta anyway (Cameron 2009, 97), so it could be by 
belonging to this domain that God exists at every world. In fact, assigning 
God’s existence to this alternative domain could even be argued for 
independently, on the basis that His existence ought to be entirely other than that 
of His creation. It’s therefore quite fitting that God exists in a different way 
from all else. Importantly, though, God needs to be the only member of this 
domain, lest He be considered in the same ontological category as something 
else – say, numbers. If numbers exist from the standpoint of every possible 
world, it must be in a less fundamental way than God, because everything 
depends upon Him for its existence, and He’s the source of all.20  
                                                          
20 Alternatively, one might not consider the necessity of abstracta such as numbers to be a 
threat to God’s creative power. Scott Shalkowski argues that ‘if there are abstract objects and if 
they are the necessary existents that ground necessities, then it not only makes no sense to 
suggest that God somehow explains them, it is also unnecessary to think that any ‘limits’ they 
impose upon God threaten divine supremacy and majesty’ (2014, 153). This is because these just 
are necessary: there’s nothing beyond them that God can’t do, for the only things that lie beyond 
them are those that are impossible. It might not even be such a problem, therefore, if we posit 
the existence of numbers as strictly necessary in such a way that they don’t rely on God for their 
existence. We can argue that they remain no threat to God’s majesty and power.  




Cameron has thus given the atemporalist the resources to explain God’s 
necessity in terms of existence ‘at’ all modal realist worlds, by appealing to the 
standpoint relation. Presumably, people in other possible worlds can also be 
world–mates with this very same (timeless) God in this manner, without 
needing to exhibit spatio–temporal relations to Him.21 Assuming GMR, we can 
contend that the God who exists from the standpoint of each world is one and 
the same God across all worlds. Cameron says that ‘counterpart theory is 
unmotivated for objects that have their intrinsic properties essentially’ (2009, 
99). God can’t be God without possessing all of the intrinsic properties that He 
does, and so there arises no potential conflict between His different intrinsic 
properties at different worlds.22 I therefore maintain that atemporalists have the 
resources to respond to Sheehy’s worry. They can consistently be modal realists 
and maintain that a timeless God is necessary. He (the very same God) exists at 
every possible world, because He exists from the standpoint of every possible 
world.  
 
5.2. Worlds apart: which ones do we consider? 
 
Returning, then, to Leftow’s claim, it could be argued that genuine modal 
realists are in a better position to uphold it than ersatzists. Genuine modal 
realists think that every possible way that the world can consistently be 
concretely exists, and could thus maintain that many worlds with far less sin 
than our own are indeed actual. They could claim, in line with Leftow, that we 
do get modal variation if we stop restricting our attention to possible worlds 
with as much, or more sin than ours. After all, just one possible world where 
the Son isn’t incarnate would be sufficient to yield modal variation and make 
true the claim that the timeless Son becomes incarnate. It could be argued that 
there are worlds with far less sin than ours (from the standpoint of which the 
Son still exists), and at these worlds He doesn’t even need to consider 
                                                          
21 There’s a further motivation for these relations that we exhibit to God not being 
spatiotemporal: if everyone in the multiverse bears any sort of spatiotemporal relation to the 
very same God, we’re in danger of all worlds collapsing into one, simply in virtue of these 
connecting relations.  
22 An anonymous referee worries that, if existing from the standpoint of all worlds is to 
belong to the domain of abstracta, then we have a difference between typical members of this 
domain (such as numbers) and God—in that typical abstracta do not have causal power, 
whereas God does. In turn, this causal relation between God and all worlds could in fact lead to 
modal collapse—as in the footnote above. However, I would maintain that a timeless God’s 
causal power is not spatial or temporal, and it is only by virtue of causation typically being 




incarnating. This is because humanity is already in a fulfilled and loving 
relationship with God, and there’s very little (if any) sin. If we were to consider 
these (concretely existing) worlds, then Leftow’s modal claim goes through and 
we can make sense of ‘becoming’ incarnate in terms of modal variation. 
However, it seems that in this situation Leftow’s modal claim is too weak. This is 
because we’re no longer restricting our attention to the relevantly similar 
possible worlds that are sufficient to generate a substantial sense in which the 
Son ‘could have refrained’ from being incarnate. I explained this in section 2, 
and it’s for this reason that the genuine modal realist, to the extent that she 
widens her scope to the worlds with very little sin, is diminishing the strength 
of Leftow’s modal claim. On top of this, there’s a further worry that lies waiting 
in the wings if we adopt GMR. I’ll now illustrate it, strengthening my argument 
against Leftow. 
 
5.3. A Further Worry for Modal Realists 
 
The incarnation, according to Christianity, is unique in that it had never 
happened before and will never happen again: the Son’s becoming flesh was 
enough to atone for the sins of all humanity for the rest of time. Let’s call this 
the ‘uniqueness requirement’.23 It’s evidently central to Christianity, and a claim 
that must be upheld in line with orthodoxy. If one interprets Leftow’s modal 
argument as a genuine modal realist would, then one faces the additional worry 
that the uniqueness requirement is flouted.  
Given that all possible worlds concretely exist on GMR, just one such other–
worldly incarnation is all that we need to be in violation of the uniqueness 
requirement. Put differently, the contingency that we desire from Leftow’s 
modal claim is that there’s no other world at which the Word takes on flesh. 
Ersatzists, importantly, don’t face such worries, because they hold that only one 
world in fact obtains, so only one incarnation concretely exists.24 If we’re 
genuine modal realists, assuming that God is omnibenevolent and that there 
exist worlds as sinful as our own, it emerges that we can’t help but breach the 
uniqueness requirement. This is really no surprise, given that violating it is 
surely easier to do than it is to endorse incarnations in all relevantly similar 
possible worlds. This unwelcome outcome is an additional reason why GMR 
isn’t congruous with Leftow’s modal claim.  
                                                          
23 See also the fifth ecumenical council, where the uniqueness requirement is endorsed (Price 
2009).  
24 Unless, of course, there are multiple incarnations within a world, but this isn’t something 
that I’m examining here.  




One potential line of response here is that the incarnation is unique according 
to GMR, because the Son’s incarnation in our world was enough to atone 
everybody in every other possible world. Timothy O’Connor and Phillip 
Woodward suggest a view in this vicinity: 
 
Human persons vary considerably, yet God’s incarnation as the particular first–
century Palestinian man Jesus of Nazareth is thought to serve God’s restorative 
and identifying purposes for all of us. Why not for all [divine image–bearing] 
creatures human and non–human alike? (2015, 231) 
 
Here, the authors are suggesting that God’s incarnation as Jesus in our world 
could be powerful enough to atone every species made in God’s image, for the 
rest of time. In fact, it could be added that it’s down–playing the significance of 
the incarnation to assume that the Son’s sacrifice couldn’t accomplish such a 
task. If this were the case, the argument could be applied across logical space as 
a whole to argue that we don’t require incarnations in worlds with as much or 
more sin than our own, and so we can make sense of cross–worldly variation 
regarding the incarnation. However, there are several reasons to find this 
problematic, which O’Connor and Woodward are themselves aware of. Firstly, 
it seems presumptuous to suppose that we humans have ‘won an incarnational 
lottery’ (ibid.), because there seems to be no reason why God would choose to 
be incarnate as one of us over being a human in a different world, or a member 
of a different species in any world. Moreover, the authors question how 
creatures in other (spatio–temporally discrete) worlds could know that their sins 
have been redeemed (ibid., 231–2). This leads to the related worry that these 
other–worldly creatures won’t feel the comfort and hope that we in our world 
feel in our awareness of this knowledge. 
Nevertheless, one might respond that the incarnation is still a unique event 
even if it happens at other worlds, because it only happens elsewhere in the 
sense that its counterparts happen. Each of these counterpart incarnations are 
brought about by the Son, who we’ve seen exists from the standpoint of every 
possible world. Furthermore, the other worlds where incarnations take place 
are all and only those in a similar state to our own regarding amounts of sin, 
and where the person who is incarnate is sufficiently similar to Jesus to be His 
counterpart, at a sufficiently similar period of history.  
The problem here is that to the extent that we embrace GMR, we must also 
embrace an increase in number in these incarnations, given that the other–
worldly incarnations are all real. More forcefully, given the spatio–temporal 
separation of worlds, Christ incarnate must differ at each one.25 This is supported 
                                                          
25 With the exception of potential qualitatively identical worlds. 
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by Cameron. We’ve seen he says that, just as unchanging objects don’t face the 
problem of temporary intrinsics, ‘counterpart theory is unmotivated for objects 
that have their intrinsic properties essentially’ (2009, 99). For entities belonging 
to the latter category, such as the Son, we have: 
 
…no problem in holding that [they] strictly and literally [exist] at more than 
one world. There will never arise a potential conflict with Leibniz’s law, since 
there will never be one world at which [the object] is intrinsically F and another 
at which [it] is intrinsically not–F (ibid., 99–100).  
 
In contrast, when we consider the incarnate Son, we evidently want to say that 
His actions (although all perfectly good) vary across worlds in response to the 
different events and circumstances there. The uniqueness requirement thus 
remains flouted, because different divine incarnations concretely exist in 
different possible worlds. Christ incarnate is a temporal, mutable being, and so 
He’ll possess different intrinsic properties at different times. Moreover, it’s also 
important to hold that Christ incarnate differs across worlds simply because of 
the spatio–temporal separation of worlds. If the very same temporal, mutable 
being was able to exist within different spatio–temporally separated worlds, 
then these worlds would not in fact be spatio–temporally separated. Rather, 
they’d be parts of the very same world. It is, after all, part of the definition of 
genuine modal realist worlds that they’re unified by their parts being spatio–
temporally related, and by their spatio–temporal separation from other worlds 
and their parts. These are important reasons as to why Christ incarnate can’t 
enjoy trans–world identity.26  
Cashing out the claim that the timeless Son of God ‘becomes’ incarnate due 
to variation across genuine modal realist worlds therefore leads to us being 
unable to make sense of any cross–worldly variation regarding the incarnation. 
This is because at all of the relevantly similar worlds to our own, the Son is 
incarnate, so we end up endorsing multiple incarnations. A further problematic 
consequence of a genuine modal realist’s interpretation of Leftow’s claim is that 
we violate the all–important uniqueness requirement that’s central to a 
Christian understanding of the incarnation. After making his modal claim, 
Leftow argues that the ball is in his opponent’s court, and that they must provide 
an account of why modal variation isn’t a sufficient explanation of the Son 
                                                          
26 A further issue suggests itself here: how can Christ incarnate be identical with the Son of 
God, as must be the case according to orthodoxy? If many different counterparts of Christ are 
all identical with the very same Son who possess trans–world identity, then does this mean that 
all worlds collapse into one? Alternatively, how does one and the same being (the Son, and the 
various counterparts of Christ) exist both from the standpoint of every possible world, and in 
just one possible world?  




becoming incarnate. I’ve engaged in debate in response to Leftow’s challenge, 
arguing that Leftow’s modal claim doesn’t achieve cross–worldly variation 




I’ve argued in this section that there’s no clear sense in which the Word taking 
on flesh varies across worlds, so atemporalists can’t appeal to modal variation 
as a way that the Son becomes incarnate. Furthermore, Leftow’s claim 
undermines the libertarian freedom of the Son, which is a result that Leftow 
himself would clearly be unhappy with. I explained that it’s possible to adopt a 
compatibilist account of God’s freedom here, in order to maintain that the Son 
is still free, but I anticipated that most Christians (including Leftow himself) 
wouldn’t find this option desirable. I also illustrated a further unwelcome result 
of adopting GMR: we end up violating the all–important uniqueness 
requirement of the incarnation. I therefore conclude that if God is atemporal, 
there are great tensions with understanding the Son ‘becoming’ incarnate in 
terms of mere modal variation. The modal account only seems workable if we 
dispense with (or possibly re–work our understanding of) God’s libertarian 
freedom. For now, though, I bat the ball back to Leftow’s side of the net: the 
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